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Insider Trading: Does “Aware” Really Resolve the 
“Possession” Versus “Use” Debate? 
Jennifer L. Neumann∗ 
Congress passed Rule 10b5-11 in August 20002 to resolve a circuit 
split among federal courts as to whether the “possession” or “use” of 
material3 nonpublic4 information is the proper standard for courts to 
use in cases of insider trading.5 Rule 10b5-1 imposes liability when a 
person is “aware” of the material nonpublic information when they 
participate in a securities trade.6 This Note addresses whether the 
inclusion of the term “aware” resolves a circuit split centering on a 
debate between the terms “possession” and “use.”7 
 
 ∗ J.D., Washington University School of Law, 2002.  
 1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2000); see infra note 6. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Under the uniform standard, information is considered “material” if the reasonable 
investor would place significance on the withheld or misrepresented information. Basic, Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 (1988). 
 4. Two cases from the same circuit established two different views as to when 
information is considered public. In S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., information is public if it 
has been, “[e]ffectively disclosed in a manner sufficient to insure its availability to the investing 
public.” S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968). In United States v. 
Libera, the court determined that information is public even if it was not publicly announced 
when those that knew the information caused the information to be “[f]ully impounded in the 
price of a particular stock.” United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993). 
Information is nonpublic according to the SEC when “[i]t has not been disseminated in a 
manner making it available to investors generally.” In re Investors Management Co., Inc., 
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,163, at 80,519 (July 29, 1971).  
 5. Selective Disclosure Rule Gains Approval by Divided SEC, 32 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) 1089, 1090 (2000); SEC Ends Selective Disclosure and Clarifies Insider Trading Rules, 
6 SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP. 10, 10 (2000); SEC Proposes Rules to Clarify Insider Trading Laws, 
15 CORP. OFFICERS & DIRECTORS LIABILITY LITIG. REP. 13, 13 (2000). 
 6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b). “[A] purchase or sale of a security of an issuer is ‘on the 
basis of’ material nonpublic information about that security or issuer if the person making the 
purchase or sale was aware of the material nonpublic information when the person made the 
purchase or sale.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 7. Passage of a regulation using either the term “possession” or “use” as the proper 
standard to use in cases of insider trading would leave no room for debate. Instead of using 
either term, Congress adopted the term “aware.” Id. § 240.10b5-1 (2000).  
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Under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19348 and Rule 
10b-5,9 insiders10 are prohibited from trading securities on the basis 
of material nonpublic information.11 A violation of federal securities 
law occurs when an insider trades on the basis of information 
obtained as a result of her position, which violates a duty owed to 
another.12 Federal circuit courts are divided regarding whether “on 
the basis of” involves the “possession” or “use” of material nonpublic 
information.13 
This Note argues that Rule 10b-5-1 does resolve the current 
circuit split.14 The Rule adopts the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) long-held belief that knowing possession is the 
proper standard to apply in cases of insider trading.15 Rule 10b5-1 
also addresses and resolves the main concerns expressed by those that 
advocated the use standard as the proper standard.16 
Part I of this Note examines the current circuit split regarding the 
“possession” versus “use” debate as to the proper interpretation of 
 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). Specifically, it is illegal “[t]o use or employ, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national security exchange or any 
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention 
of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe.” Id.  
 9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). 
   It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course 
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
Id.  
 10. An insider is “a person who has knowledge of facts not available to the general 
public.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 798 (7th ed. 1999). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998); see also supra notes 8-9.  
 12. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-30 (1980). Under an alternative theory, 
the misappropriation theory, the Rules are violated when a corporate outsider misuses 
information received from a source to whom a fiduciary duty is owed. United States v. 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). This theory will not be discussed in this Note. 
 13. See, e.g., United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 236 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 
2001); SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998); see also supra note 5. 
 14. See infra notes 293-96 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 200-50 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 251-94 and accompanying text.  
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what constitutes a trade made “on the basis of” material nonpublic 
information.17 Part II of this Note addresses the passage of Rule 
10b5-1.18 Part III analyzes the success of Rule 10b5-1 in resolving 
the circuit split.19 Finally, Part IV contains the conclusion.20 
I. THE “POSSESSION” VERSUS “USE” DEBATE 
The SEC first stated the classic “disclose or abstain” theory21 of 
insider trading in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,22 which was 
subsequently adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chiarella v. 
United States.23 This theory imposes a duty on corporate insiders to 
reveal to shareholders material facts known as a result of the insider’s 
position that would affect the shareholders’ investment decisions.24 If 
it is too difficult to disclose the information as required by this first 
part of the theory, the second part of the theory provides that the 
insider must refrain from partaking in any transaction involving the 
inside information.25 These two rules arise from the desire to prevent 
the unfairness that occurs when insiders use the material nonpublic 
information for their personal benefit.26 
Commentators label the debate that instigated the passage of Rule 
 
 17. See infra notes 21-226 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 227-50 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 251-92 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 293-96 and accompanying text. 
 21. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997) (citing Chiarella v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980), as the source for the classic theory of insider trading liability). 
 22. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 76,803, at 81,013 (Nov. 8, 1961). The duty to disclose or abstain originates from a fiduciary 
relationship “[g]iving access . . . to information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone” and the “inherent unfairness” that results 
when confidential information is used for personal advantage. Id. at 81,017. 
 23. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-28.  
 24. Id. at 227. Specifically, the Court noted, “[t]he obligation to disclose or abstain 
derives from ‘[a]n affirmative duty to disclose . . . material facts which are known to them by 
virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if 
known, would affect their investment judgment.’” Id. (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., [1961-
1964 Transfer Binder] (CCH) ¶ 76,803, at 81,016) (alteration in original)). 
 25. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] (CCH) ¶ 76,803, at 
81,016. Specifically, the Commission noted, “[i]f . . . disclosure prior to effecting a purchase or 
sale would be improper or unrealistic under the circumstances . . . the alternative is to forgo the 
transaction.” Id. 
 26. Id. at ¶ 76,803; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222; S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 
833 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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10b5-1 as the “possession” versus “use” debate.27 The dispute centers 
on whether insiders must “disclose or abstain” when they possess 
material nonpublic information or, in the alternative, only when they 
actually use that information as the basis for a trade.28 The SEC often 
adopts the position that mere knowing possession is enough to 
warrant a violation of Rule 10b-5, while defense attorneys argue that 
actual use of the material nonpublic information is required.29 
The federal judicial decisions in three recent cases frame the 
debate.30 The Second Circuit in United States v. Teicher31 stated in 
dicta that possession of material nonpublic information was the 
correct standard for courts to use in cases of insider trading.32 In SEC 
v. Adler33 and United States v. Smith,34 the Eleventh and Ninth 
Circuits, respectively, found that actual use of nonpublic information 
was necessary to find that an insider trading violation occurred.35 
 
 27. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1066 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing the “the 
use-possession debate”); see also Allan Horwich, Possession Versus Use: Is There a Causation 
Element in the Prohibition on Insider Trading?, 52 BUS. LAW. 1235 (1997); Bryan C. Smith, 
Note, Possession Versus Use: Reconciling the Letter and the Spirit of Insider Trading 
Regulation Under Rule 10b-5, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 371 (1999); John H. Sturc & Catharine W. 
Cummer, Possession vs. Use for Insider Trading Liability, 12 No. 6 INSIGHTS 3 (1998); Oriana 
N. Li, Note, United States v. Smith: The Use-Possession Debate in SEC Enforcement Actions 
Under § 10(B), 74 WASH. L. REV. 395 (1999); Donna M. Nagy, The “Possession vs. Use” 
Debate in the Context of Securities Trading by Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never be 
Golden, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1129 (1999). 
 28. See Nagy, supra note 27, at 1130. According to Nagy: 
[T]here remains a sharp divergence of views as to whether persons subject to this rule 
must disclose or abstain from trading securities on all occasions when they are in 
possession of material nonpublic information or only on those occasions when they are 
affirmatively using that information in the course of their securities trading. 
Id. (emphasis in original); see also, e.g., supra note 26. 
 29. Nagy, supra note 27, at 1130-31. 
 30. See United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993); S.E.C. v. Adler, 137 F.3d 
1325 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other 
grounds, 236 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 31. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 112. 
 32. Specifically, the court noted, “[a] number of factors weigh in favor of a ‘knowing 
possession’ standard.” Id. at 120.  
 33. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337. 
 34. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1067. 
 35. In S.E.C. v. Adler the court chose to follow the use test. “[W]e believe that Supreme 
Court dicta and the lower court precedent suggest that the use test is the appropriate test.” 
Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337. In United States v. Smith, the court similarly determined that the use 
test was the appropriate test. “[W]e believe the weight of authority supports a ‘use’ 
requirement.” Smith, 155 F.3d at 1067. 
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A. United States v. Teicher36 
The “possession” versus “use” debate first surfaced in United 
States v. Teicher.37 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
convictions of Victor Teicher and Ross Frankel for securities 
violations.38 
Teicher and Frankel were arbitrageurs.39 Michael David, who was 
interested in arbitrage,40 worked in the corporate department of the 
law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, and Garrison (Paul 
Weiss).41 David provided Teicher and Robert Salsbury,42 who worked 
under Frankel, with information regarding potential acquisitions by 
Paul Weiss clients from December 1985 through March 1986.43 
David, Teicher, and Andrew Solomon, a trader at the brokerage firm 
of Marcus Schloss, Inc., also traded confidential information between 
themselves.44 Salsbury provided Teicher with a confidential list of 
companies that Drexel clients were contemplating either merging 
with or taking over.45 
On appeal, Teicher and Frankel argued the jury was improperly 
instructed regarding the required elements of a securities violation.46 
 
 36. 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 37. Id.; see also Li, supra note 27, at 397 (“The use-possession debate first surfaced in 
Teicher.”). 
 38. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 114, 121. Teicher was found guilty on fourteen counts, nine of 
which were for violations of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. Id. 
at 114. Frankel was found guilty on six counts, one of which was for violation of § 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. Id. 
 39. Id. at 114. Webster’s dictionary defines arbitrage as “simultaneous purchase and sale 
of the same or equivalent security, commodity contract, insurance, or foreign exchange on the 
same or different markets in order to profit from price discrepancies.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 110 (1986). The Teicher court states that “[a]rbitrage entails 
trading in securities in companies that are the subject of changes in corporate control in order to 
take advantage of fluctuations in the price of these securities.” Teicher, 987 F.2d at 114. 
 40. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 114. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. Salsbury was a “close personal friend” of David’s and both were key governmental 
witnesses. Id. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 115. 
 46. Id. at 119. They contended “that the district court’s jury charge erroneously instructed 
the jury that the defendants could be found guilty of securities fraud based upon the mere 
possession of fraudulently obtained material nonpublic information without regard to whether 
this information was the actual cause of the sale or purchase of securities.” The jury charge at 
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Defendants claimed the instruction created the possibility that a 
trader could be convicted if they continued with a previously planned 
transaction after illegitimately receiving material nonpublic 
information.47 The court did not agree that the jury was incorrectly 
instructed.48  
Defendants argued that the use of material nonpublic information 
was a prerequisite to a finding that a securities violation occurred.49 
To support their position, defendants relied on several cases that used 
language such as “trading on the basis of” to describe the actions of 
those charged with securities fraud.50 Defendants asserted that their 
interpretation would eliminate the situation where one who 
previously arranged to buy or sell a stock would be guilty of a 
securities violation if they happened to learn material nonpublic 
information prior to the completion of the planned transaction.51 
The government argued that a violation occurs when a “trade is 
conducted in ‘knowing possession’ of material nonpublic information 
obtained in breach of a fiduciary or similar duty.”52 The court gave 
 
issue stated: 
The government need not prove a causal relationship between the misappropriated 
material nonpublic information and the defendant’s trading. That is, the government 
need not prove that the defendants purchased or sold the securities because of the 
material nonpublic information that they knowingly possessed. It is sufficient if the 
government proves that the defendants purchased or sold securities while knowingly in 
possession of the material nonpublic information. 
Id. The defendants also appealed because they felt “the district court improperly excluded 
evidence of bias by a government witness.” Id. 
 47. Id. Specifically, defendant’s argued that “[a] causal connection standard would find no 
violation where a trader executes a previously and legitimately planned transaction after the 
trader wrongfully receives material nonpublic information which confirmed the transaction.” Id. 
 48. Id. Specifically, the court noted, “Teicher and Frankel argue that the charge permitted 
the jury to find them guilty of securities fraud even if they had traded upon only publicly 
available information. We [the court of appeals] find this argument unpersuasive.” Id. 
 49. Id. at 120.  
 50. Id.; see, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648 (1983); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 
199-200 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 51. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 119; see supra note 47. 
 52. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120. The knowing possession standard is “consistently endorsed 
by the SEC.” Id.; see, e.g., In re Sterling Drug, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 81,570, at 80,295 (Apr. 18, 1978). The Commission stated: 
The Commission also believes that Rule 10b-5 does not require a showing that an 
insider sold his securities for the purpose of taking advantage of material nonpublic 
information . . . [i]f an insider sells his securities while in possession of material 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol7/iss1/11
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due weight to the government’s contention because the promulgators 
of Rule 10b-5, the SEC, also supported the knowing possession 
standard.53 
The court listed several factors it considered important in 
determining that knowing possession was the proper standard.54 First, 
the court noted, “both § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 require only that a 
deceptive practice be conducted ‘in connection with the purchase or 
sale of a security.’”55 The fact that the court applied the “in 
connection with” requirement broadly indicates that the looser 
knowing possession56 standard was the correct standard.57 
Second, the court reasoned that the knowing possession standard 
complies with the “disclose or abstain” theory.58 That theory requires 
a fiduciary who possesses knowledge to either reveal that knowledge 
or refrain from acting on that knowledge.59 Since responsibility is 
placed on the possessor of information, the court noted that 
consistency dictated mere possession be the standard.60 
 
adverse nonpublic information, such an insider is taking advantage of his position to 
the detriment of the public. 
Id.  
 53. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120. Specifically, the court noted, “[a]s the promulgator of Rule 
10b-5, the SEC’s interpretation that this rule only requires ‘knowing possession’ is entitled to 
some consideration.” Id.; see, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 n.10 
(1976); see also supra note 52. 
 54. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120-21. It is worth noting that the “possession” versus “use” 
discussion was purely dicta. Specifically, the court stated, “[v]iewing the jury charge in its 
entirety and based upon the record, we find that it is unnecessary to determine whether proof of 
securities fraud requires a causal connection, because any alleged defect in the instruction was 
harmless beyond a doubt.” Id. at 120. 
 55. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120. 
 56. The actual use standard is harder to prove because it must be shown that the material 
nonpublic information the insider had was at least a factor in the decision to make or not to 
make a certain trade. It is often difficult to prove one’s mental state. Whereas with possession, it 
only need be shown that the insider had the information. 
 57. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120. Specifically, the court noted, “[w]e have previously stated 
that the ‘in connection with’ clause must be ‘construed . . . flexibly to include deceptive 
practices ‘touching’ the sale of securities, a relationship which has been described as ‘very 
tenuous indeed.’” Id. (citing United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12,18 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983) (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 
U.S. 6, 12 (1971)). 
 58. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120; see also supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. 
 59. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120; see also supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. 
 60. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120. 
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Finally, the court discussed concerns of proof.61 The court 
concluded that the knowing possession standard is less burdensome 
to prove.62 Further, the knowing possession standard “recognizes that 
one who trades while knowingly possessing material inside 
information has an informational advantage over other traders.”63 The 
court reasoned that the minor changes that could occur in the decision 
making process once information is obtained would be significantly 
reflected in “our increasingly sophisticated securities markets.”64 
B. SEC v. Adler65 
The Eleventh Circuit dealt directly with the “possession” versus 
“use” debate in SEC v. Adler.66 The Adler court adopted the use 
test.67 
The SEC brought suit against Harvey L. Pegram,68 Richard F. 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 121. Specifically, the court noted, “[a] requirement of a causal connection 
between the information and the trade could frustrate attempts to distinguish between legitimate 
trades and those conducted in connection with inside information.” Id.; see also 7 LOUIS LOSS 
& JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3505 (3d ed. 1991) (“The very difficulty of 
establishing actual use of inside information points to possession as the test.”). 
 63. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120. 
 64. Id. Specifically, the court noted: 
Unlike a loaded weapon which may stand ready but unused, material information can 
not lay idle in the human brain. The individual with such information may decide to 
trade upon that information, to alter a previously decided-upon transaction, to continue 
with a previously planned transaction even though publicly available information 
would now suggest otherwise, or simply to do nothing. In our increasingly 
sophisticated securities markets, where subtle shifts in strategy can produce dramatic 
results, it would be a mistake to think of such decisions as merely binary choices—to 
buy or to sell. 
Id.   
 65. 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 66. Id.; see supra note 54 (noting that the discussion in Teicher regarding the “possession” 
versus “use” debate was purely dicta). 
 67. Id. at 1337. Specifically, the court stated, “we believe that Supreme Court dicta and 
the lower court precedent suggest that the use test is the appropriate test.” Id. 
 68. Id. at 1327. Pegram founded Comptronix Corporation, “which provides contract 
manufacturing services to original equipment manufacturers in the electronics industry,” along 
with two others in 1984. Id. At that time he was a member of the board of directors and Vice 
President of Purchasing and Material Management for Comptronix. Id. The relationship 
between the partners “disintegrated” and Pegram was let go in 1989. Id. at 1327-28. 
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Adler,69 Philip L. Choy,70 Magatronic Trading Limited,71 and Domer 
L. Ishler72 for insider trading in 1989 and 1992.73 The district court 
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on each 
count.74 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and 
remanded to the district court75 because there were genuine issues of 
material fact present that must be determined by a jury.76  
1. The 1989 Transactions of Pegram 
Comptronix77 began to receive fewer orders from a large customer 
in the beginning of 1989.78 In August of 1989, Comptronix issued a 
press release explaining the decrease in orders.79 On September 14, 
1989, Pegram attended a meeting that involved more detailed 
discussion of Comptranix’s status.80 Although the content of the 
information revealed is disputed among the parties,81 the record is 
 
 69. Id. at 1327. Adler was an outside director of Comptronix and also a close personal 
friend of Pegram’s. Id. at 1329. 
 70. Id. at 1327. Choy was a business associate and social friend of Pegram, Adler, and 
Ishler. Id. at 1330 n.14.  
 71. Id. at 1327. Specifically, the court described Magatronic as follows: “Magatronic 
Trading, Limited is a company owned by Philip Choy and on behalf of which Choy traded his 
Comptronix stock. A default judgment was entered against Magatronic on November 30, 1995, 
in the amount of $75,000. This default judgment had not been appealed.” Id. 
 72. Id. Ishler was a business associate and friend of the other three individuals. Id. at 1330 
n.14. 
 73. Id. at 1327. Suit was brought for violations of § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The parties were also charged with violations of § 17(a) of the 
Securities Act of 1933. The SEC sought treble damages for all violations under the Insider 
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1331. Summary judgment was granted for the 1989 trades. After a deadlocked 
jury, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law for the 
1992 trades as well. Id.  
 75. Id. at 1344. 
 76. Id. at 1342-43.  
 77. See supra note 68. 
 78. Id. at 1328.  
 79. Id. Comptronix’s press release stated it “received less than anticipated orders from 
another major customer for disk drive products. As a result, management expects that sales and 
earnings for the second half of 1989 will be lower than previously anticipated, but still 
significantly higher than the levels of the previous year.” Id. 
 80. Id. at 1328. 
 81. Id. Pegram asserted that “nothing new of a material nature” was relayed other than 
“Conners shaky possibly all business offshore.” Id. The SEC contended that the chief executive 
officer (CEO) of Comptronix reported: 
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clear that the board mentioned the instability of future orders from at 
least one major company.82 
Pegram sold 20,000 shares of Comptronix stock83 between 
September 19 and September 26, 1989.84 Comptronix issued another 
press release on October 6, 1989 similar to the August press release 
informing the public that it received less orders than expected from a 
major customer.85 The price of Comptronix stock dropped over the 
next two trading days in response to the press release.86 Pegram saved 
a significant amount of money by selling his Comptronix stock 
before the October 6 press release.87 
Pegram alleged that he did not sell the stock because of any 
material nonpublic information received at the September 14 
meeting,88 but instead, because of a pre-existing plan to do so.89 He 
 
The Company was expecting either a complete termination or a substantial reduction 
in the orders from Conners, which is the largest customer of the Company due to 
Conners moving much of its manufacturing off-shore. [The CEO] stated that because 
Connors was the Company’s largest customer, when the information was disseminated 
the stock of the Company would likely drop substantially. 
Id. This information was reflected in the revised minutes of the September 14 meeting. Id. 
Pegram contended that “the revised minutes were ‘doctored’ by [the CEO] in order to make it 
appear that Pegram obtained material nonpublic information at the . . . meeting.” Id. at 1328 
n.3.  
 82. Id. at 1328. 
 83. Id. Pegram was issued 869,897 shares of Comptronix stock in 1984. Id. at 1327. 
 84. Id. at 1328. 
 85. Id. The release stated that the company “had received less than anticipated orders from 
a major customer for disk drive products.” Id.; see also supra note 79. This release also 
contained language that informed the public that the earnings for the fourth quarter would be 
lower than the earnings for the same quarter in 1988. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1328. The company 
“expect[ed] orders from this customer to decline even further in the fourth quarter . . . as a 
result, Comptronix anticipates that sales and earnings in the fourth quarter will be below the 
levels in the same period of 1988.” Id. (alteration in original). Pegram alleged that a press 
release was issued later that same day which retracted the statement that the earnings would be 
lower in the fourth quarter of 1989 than in the fourth quarter of 1988. Id. at 1328 n.5. No 
evidence of such an amended release was ever presented. Id. 
 86. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1328. Specifically, “the price of Comptronix stock dropped from 
$3.63 to $2.63 over the next two trading days [following the October 6th press release].” Id. 
 87. Id.  Specifically, the court noted, “[t]he SEC maintains that by selling 20,000 shares of 
Comptronix stock before the October 6 press release, Pegram avoided $17,625 in losses.” Id. 
Regardless of the validity of the arguments presented by either side, simple math dictates that if 
Pegram had sold after the October 6 press release, he would have received less money for each 
share he sold. 
 88. Id. at 1328. 
 89. Id. Specifically, the court noted, “Pegram contends that his September 1989 sales of 
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claimed he was forced to wait until after September 14, 198990 to sell 
the stock because of a lock-up agreement.91 He also offered evidence 
that he gained the required permission92 to sell from Comptronix’s 
counsel.93  
The district court expressed doubt that the information Pegram 
obtained at the September 14 meeting was material94 and concluded 
that Pegram did not act with scienter95 as required.96 Thus, the district 
court granted Pegram’s motion for summary judgment.97 
On appeal,98 the SEC contended that the district court “incorrectly 
adopted a causal connection standard99 for insider trading violations 
that allows a trader to avoid liability if the trader proves that he did 
not purchase or sell securities because of the material nonpublic 
information that the trader knowingly possessed.”100 The SEC argued 
 
Comptronix stock were not made as a result of any alleged material nonpublic information, but 
were part of a preexisting plan to sell Comptronix stock in order to buy an eighteen wheel truck 
for his son’s business.” Id. 
 90. Id. at 1329. Pegram met with his stockbroker on September 1, 1989 and was informed 
that the lock-up agreement expired on September 14, 1989. Id.  
 91. Id. at 1328. Specifically, the court noted, “[t]his lock-up agreement prevented 
Comptronix officers and directors from selling any shares of Comptronix stock until 120 days 
after the initial public offering of Comptronix stock on May 19, 1992.” Id. at 1328 n.6. 
 92. Id. at 1329. Pegram was required by Comptronix’s company policy to obtain approval 
from Comptronix’s general counsel before selling shares. Id.  Pegram actually received 
permission for a sale on both August 4 and September 16, 1989. Id. 
 93. Id. “When asked why he interposed no objection when told of Pegram’s proposed 
sale, and whether he believed Pegram possessed material nonpublic information at the time, 
[general counsel] stated that he ‘really did not think of it in those terms.’” Id. at 1329 n.7. 
 94. Id. at 1329. 
 95. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (stating that “scienter refers 
to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud”); BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1347 (7th ed. 1999) (defining scienter as “1) A degree of knowledge that makes a 
person legally responsible for the consequences of his act or omission . . . 2) A mental state 
consisting of an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In this sense, the term is used most 
often in the context of securities fraud. The Supreme Court has held that to establish a claim for 
damages under 10b-5, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with scienter”). 
 96. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1329. Acting with scienter is required under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5. Id.; see also Horwich, supra note 27 (stating that “[s]cienter is a necessary element of an 
SEC or private civil action under Rule 10b-5, as well as a criminal action”); Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. at 193; Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980); supra note 95. 
 97. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1329. 
 98. Id. at 1327. 
 99. The terms “use” and “causal connection” can be used interchangeably. 
 100. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1332. The SEC contended that if the “use” standard was not 
applied, the district court would not have considered summary judgment proper. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship










200 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 7:189 
 
 
that Pegram, as a corporate executive,101 violated § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 because he “traded in his company’s stock while in possession 
of material nonpublic information.”102 
The court of appeals first focused on the language of § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.103 The court determined that although it was not explicit, 
“the language suggests a focus on fraud, deception, and 
manipulation.”104 The court then mentioned several applicable 
Supreme Court cases wherein the Court acknowledged in dicta that 
use of material nonpublic information was an element of insider 
trading.105  
The court noted that the SEC’s view on the possession versus use 
debate was inconsistent over time.106 In 1971, the SEC determined 
that one of the elements required for violations of insider trading was 
that “the material nonpublic information ‘be a factor in [the insider’s] 
decision to effect the transaction.’”107 This element reflects an 
adoption of the use standard. The SEC ignored the 1971 decision 
 
 101. See supra note 68. 
 102. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1332. Specifically, the court noted, “[t]he SEC argues that it 
presented evidence that Pegram knowingly possessed material nonpublic information.” Id.  
 103. Id. at 1332-33. 
 104. Id. at 1333. 
 105. Id. at 1333-34. According to the court in Adler, in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 
222 (1980), the Court stated “an insider’s duty arises from the ‘unfairness of allowing a 
corporate insider to take advantage of [inside] information by trading without disclosure.’” 
Adler, 137 F.3d at 1333 (alteration in original) (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., [1961-1964 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,803, at 81,017 n.15 (Nov. 8, 1961). The 
Chiarella Court also stated that “[t]he federal courts have found violations of [section] 10(b) 
where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for their own benefit.” Adler, 137 F.3d 
at 1333 (alteration in original) (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 
1968)). The Adler court also looked to Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). The Adler court 
stated: 
“[N]ot only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from personally using 
disclosed corporate information to their advantage, but they also may not give such 
information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information 
for their personal gain.” This language and the Dirks Court’s holding that an inside 
tipper must gain some personal advantage in order for an outside tippee to be liable for 
trading on material nonpublic information, suggests that knowing possession of 
material nonpublic information at the time of trading may not be enough to establish 
liability for insider trading. 
Adler, 127 F.3d at 1333-34 (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659-60). 
 106. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1336. 
 107. Id. (citing In re Investors Management Company, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), ¶ 78,163, at 80,519 (July 29, 1971)).  
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when it found that mere possession of material nonpublic information 
was sufficient to find that a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
occurred in 1978.108 Since then, the SEC consistently adopted this 
position.109 
The court recognized that the choice between possession and use 
was difficult, but chose to adopt the use standard.110 The court 
indicated that the SEC’s concern over matters of proof was countered 
by the “inference of use that arises from the fact that an insider traded 
while in possession of inside information.”111 The elimination of the 
proof concern by this inference was one of several reasons given for 
the adoption of the use test.112 It was also important to the court that 
the use test “best comports” with the applicable statutes.113 The court 
was fearful that convictions based on mere possession of material 
nonpublic information would “prohibit actions that are not 
themselves fraudulent.”114 
The court, however, did not uphold the district court’s grant of 
 
 108. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1336. Specifically, the court noted “that ‘Rule 10b-5 does not 
require a showing that an insider sold his securities for the purpose of taking advantage of 
material nonpublic information.’” Id. (citing In re Sterling Drug, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,570 at 80,298 (Apr. 18, 1978)). 
 109. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1336 n.28; see also Insider Trading Sanctions and S.E.C. 
Enforcement Legislation: Hearing on HR 559 Before Subcommittee on Telecommunications, 
Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th 
Cong. 48-49 (1983) (stating that the SEC’s “consistent position has been that possession of 
material inside information is the test”). The Adler court also noted, “[i]n a 1983 address, the 
S.E.C. General Counsel stated that the S.E.C. ‘will continue to consider trading while in 
possession of insider information as the test of liability, not the more stringent [use] test,’ but 
acknowledged that where the trader has a ‘plausible argument that complicates proof,’ the 
S.E.C. will be ‘cautious’ about bringing the case.” Adler, 137 F.3d at 1336 n.28 (citing Dirks 
Enhanced SEC Enforcement of Insider Trading, Goelzer says, 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 
1820, 1821 (1983)). 
 110. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337. The court noted that the Supreme Court provided no definite 
guidance, “[h]owever, we believe that Supreme Court dicta and the lower court precedent 
suggest that the use test is the appropriate test.” Id. 
 111. Id. Specifically, the court noted, “when an insider trades while in possession of 
material nonpublic information, a strong inference arises that such information was used by the 
insider in trading. The insider can attempt to rebut the inference by adducing evidence . . . that 
the information was not used.” Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1338. The court of appeals noted that the statutes and the Supreme Court 
focused on the elements of fraud and deception. Id.; see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 
U.S. 642, 655 (1997) (stating that “§ 10(b) is not an all-purpose breach of fiduciary duty ban; 
rather it trains on conduct involving manipulation or deception”). 
 114. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1338.  
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summary judgment for Pegram.115 The court of appeals instead 
concluded that possession of material nonpublic information created 
a real possibility that this information was used in the trade.116 The 
court concluded that because genuine issues of material fact remained 
regarding whether or not the information was used in the decision to 
make the trades, summary judgment was inappropriate.117 
2. The 1992 Transactions of Pegram, Choy, and Ishler  
Adler attended a Comptronix board meeting on November 15, 
1992118 during which the board informed him of potential fraud 
within the company.119 Adler was part of the Special Committee 
created at this meeting to oversee the inquiry into the fraud.120 After 
investigating,121 the board issued a public statement on November 25, 
1992 that described the fraud and indicated that there would be 
“material adjustments to the Company’s historically audited financial 
statements.”122 On the day of the announcement, trading was 
suspended for a period of time.123 Comptronix’s common stock 
dropped significantly in value when trading resumed.124 
Adler and Pegram had been friends for a number of years.125 The 
day following Adler’s disclosure of the potential fraud, Pegram called 
Adler at 7:53 in the morning.126 Pegram called his wife, Margie, at 
 
 115. Id. at 1339. 
 116. Id.; see also supra note 111. 
 117. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1339. 
 118. Id. at 1329. 
 119. Id. Specifically, the board alleged that Comptronix executives “made $4 million in 
false accounting entries in order to support certain capitalized costs of the company.” Id.  
 120. Id. The members of the Special Committee “were expressly advised that they must 
keep the information they learned at the Board meeting secret and confidential.” Id. at 1329 n.8. 
 121. The Special Committee determined that “$16 million in false accounting entries had 
actually been made, that there were not legitimate capitalizable costs to offset these false 
entries, and that Comptronix’s sales records and earnings had been misstated.” Id. at 1329.  
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. Specifically, “[w]hen trading resumed by the end of the day, Comptronix common 
stock had lost 72 percent of its value, dropping from a closing price of $22 per share on 
November 24th to a closing price of $6 1/8 per share on November 25.” Id. 
 125. Id.; see also supra note 69. 
 126. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1329. At this time, Pegram was no longer an officer or director of 
Comptronix. Id. The phone call lasted seventy-two seconds. Id. Another call, lasting 114 
seconds was placed to Adler at 4:26 p.m. Id. at 1330 n.9. 
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home two minutes later.127 At 8:07 a.m., Margie called their 
stockbroker to sell 50,000 shares of Comptronix stock.128 A total of 
150,000 shares of their Comptronix stock were sold between 
November 16 and November 24, 1992.129 
The SEC alleged that the stock was sold because of information 
given to Pegram by Adler,130 and, as a result, Pegram saved 
$2,315,375 in losses.131 Pegram alleged that the sale of the stock was 
part of a “pre-existing plan to sell 150,000 shares of Comptronix after 
the November 3 presidential election.”132  
Pegram argued that the phone call to his wife was a wake-up call 
during which no mention of Adler or the stock was made.133 
According to Pegram, the calls to Adler were similar to those made 
for about a year regarding normal business operations.134 He 
contended, therefore, that he was not in the possession of material 
nonpublic information when the trades were made.135 
The SEC alleged that Pegram provided Choy136 and Ishler137 with 
the material nonpublic information the SEC maintains he received 
from Adler.138 Pegram made a call to Choy the same day he called 
Adler.139 After the call, Choy sold Comptronix stock.140 The SEC 
 
 127. Id. at 1330. 
 128. Id. Pegram’s wife told the stockbroker to sell the shares at a limit price of $21 per 
share or better. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. Pegram contended that he was told to diversify his stock holdings and was told to 
do so during the fourth quarter. Id. Pegram also contended that he and his wife had to wait until 
November 16, 1992 to sell due to Margie’s father’s illness. Id. As well, Pegram pointed out that 
the sale of the stock was “consistent with their sale of 60,000 Comptronix shares in 1990 and 
380,000 Comptronix shares in 1991.” Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. The court noted, “Pegram testified that between December 1991 and December 
1992, he frequently contacted Adler concerning requests for price quotes on electronic parts and 
materials that Pegram needed for his business, BST manufacturing.” Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See supra note 70. 
 137. See supra note 72. 
 138. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1330.  
 139. Id. Pegram called Choy at 8:02 p.m. on November 16. Id. The call lasted four minutes 
forty-two seconds. Id. at 1331 n.15. 
 140. Id. at 1330. The court noted, “[a]t 9:39 p.m. [on November 18] Choy telefaxed the 
brokerage firm for his company and directed its stockbroker to sell 5,000 shares of Comptronix 
stock at a price of US $21/22. The order was executed on November 17th and 19th.” Id. at 
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alleged that Choy was able to avoid substantial losses because he 
traded while in the possession of material nonpublic information.141 
Both Pegram and Choy testified that they did not discuss Comptronix 
stock during their phone call.142 
Ishler called Adler on November 15, 1992 while Adler was 
joining, via telephone, the meeting at Comptronix about the potential 
fraud.143 They were unable to speak at that moment and Ishler was 
not able to speak to Alder again until November 23, 1992.144 Adler 
and Ishler alleged that the conversation only centered on trying to 
arrange a meeting.145 
On November 24, 1992, Ishler purchased 300 “put options”146 in 
Comptronix stock. The SEC maintained that Ishler purchased these 
put options because of the material nonpublic information he 
received.147 Ishler gained a substantial amount of money148 when he 
exercised his put options after Comptronix’s November 25 public 
announcement.149 
The district court denied the motion for summary judgment 
pertaining to the 1992 transactions “because the timing of the 
telephone calls between the appellees raised a ‘reasonable inference 
 
1330-31.  
 141. Id. at 1331. Specifically, the S.E.C. contended that Choy and Magatronic avoided 
losses of approximately $75,000. Id. 
 142. Id. Pegram and Choy claimed the phone conversation “was related to price quotes for 
Pegram’s business and that Comptronix was not discussed by the parties.” Id. Pegram 
contended that phone calls pertaining to business commonly occurred between the two from 
December 1991 through January 1993. Id. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. During the original phone call, “Adler put the Board meeting on hold and told 
Ishler that he could not talk with him and than Adler would call Ishler later.” Id. They finally 
spoke when Adler was in the United States for a Comptronix board meeting. Id.  
 145. Id. “Adler told Ishler that he was in a meeting and that as soon as he knew his 
schedule, Adler would call Ishler so they could get together.” Id. 
 146. Id. The put options, purchased for $21,000, “gave Ishler the right to sell 30,000 shares 
of Comptronix stock at $20 a share and the options expired in three weeks.” Id. at 1331 n.17. 
Comptronix was selling at $22 ½ per share and Ishler would lose his investment if the price did 
not fall below $20 per share. Ishler maintains that he went to his stockbroker to sell some 
Comptronix shares short, but that either he or his stockbroker made the decision that buying the 
put options would be more profitable. Id.; see also infra note 167 for meaning of a short sale. 
 147. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1331. The SEC contended that he received the material nonpublic 
information from either the phone calls with Adler or a phone conversation with Pegram. Id. 
 148. Id. Specifically, Ishler made approximating $368,750 when he exercised the options. 
Id. 
 149. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 122. 
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of materiality and scienter on the part of [Pegram].’”150 The jury was 
not able to reach a verdict after trial,151 and the district court granted 
the renewed motions for summary judgment as a matter of law.152  
The court of appeals held that the “SEC raised a reasonable 
inference that Pegram possessed nonpublic information.”153 The court 
followed the same rationale as when discussing Pegram’s 1989 
transaction154 when the court required that use of the material 
nonpublic information must be proven in order to find a violation of 
§ 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.155 Nevertheless, since a jury could reasonably 
conclude that the parties possessed the material nonpublic 
information,156 the district court’s granting of summary judgment was 
inappropriate.157 
C. United States v. Smith158 
Shortly after the Eleventh Circuit decided SEC v. Adler,159 the 
Ninth Circuit also chose to apply the use standard160 in United States 
v. Smith.161 
Richard Smith worked for PDA Engineering, Inc. (PDA),162 a 
publicly traded software design firm.163 In 1993, after working for 
PDA for about three years,164 Smith owned 51,445 shares of PDA 
stock.165 He sold all of these shares between June 10 and June 18, 
 
 150. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1331.  
 151. Id.; see also supra note 74. 
 152. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1331-32; see also supra note 74. 
 153. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1340.  
 154. See supra notes 98-117 and accompanying text. 
 155. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1340. 
 156. Id. at 1341. 
 157. Id. at 1342-44. 
 158. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 159. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1325; see also supra notes 65-157. 
 160. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1067. Specifically, the court stated, “we believe that the weight of 
authority supports a ‘use’ requirement.” Id. 
 161. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1051. 
 162. Id. at 1053. Smith was the Vice President of North American Sales and worked in the 
Nashville office. Id. 
 163. Id. PDA’s headquarters were in Orange County. Id. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. 
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1993166 as well as “selling short”167 an additional 35,000 shares.168 
Smith’s parents also sold a substantial number of shares during the 
same time period.169 
Smith left a message on a co-worker’s answering machine on June 
19, 1993170 indicating that he sold the shares of stock because he was 
worried about a decline in value.171 As a result, the SEC decided to 
investigate Smith regarding his sale of stock.172 The SEC held an 
investigation173 and after nine months, turned the matter over to the 
U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles for potential criminal prosecution.174 
The government indicted Smith on eleven counts of insider 
trading in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. A short sale is:  
A sale of a security that the seller does not own or has not contracted for at the time of 
sale and that the seller must borrow to make delivery. Such a sale is usu[ally] made 
when the seller expects the security’s price to drop. If the price does drop, the seller 
can make a profit on the difference between the price of the shares sold and the lower 
price of the shares bought to pay back the borrowed shares. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1339 (7th ed. 1999); see also LOUIS LOSS AND JOEL SELIGMAN, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 699 (3d ed. 1988) (citing S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 
50-51 (1934)). 
 168. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1053. 25,000 shares were sold on July 8, 1993 and the other 10,000 
were sold on July 20, 1993. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. Smith left the message on the machine of Angela Bravo de Rueda who worked in 
the Los Angeles office. Id. A co-worker of Bravo de Rueda’s who broke into her voicemail 
system heard the message. A chain of people informed the SEC that an “anonymous informant 
had a tape of a conversation involving an individual purporting to be Smith discussing insider 
trading.” Id. at 1054.  
 171. Id. at 1053. 
Hi Angie, Rich . . . I talked to Tom last night after I left you some messages and he 
and Lou discovered that there was about a million and half dollar mistake in the 
budget, so now we’re back at ground zero and we’ve got to scramble for the next few 
days. Anyway, finally sold all my stock off on Friday and I’m going to short the stock 
because I know its going to go down a couple of points here in the next week as soon 
as Lou releases the information about next year’s earnings actually. 
Id.  
 172. Id. at 1053. Interestingly, Smith’s sales did save him a significant amount of money. 
Id. After PDA released its fourth-quarter sales figures on August 19, 1993, the stock dropped 
from $8 per share to $5 per share. The sale allowed Smith to avoid $150,000 in losses and the 
short selling allowed him to gain a profit of $50,000. Id. at 1053 n.2. 
 173. Id. at 1054. During the investigation, the SEC obtained documents, deposed witnesses, 
and gained a copy of the answering machine recording. Id. 
 174. Id. The U.S. Attorney’s Office and the FBI investigated further. Id. 
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1934175 and Rule 10b-5.176 A jury found Smith guilty of insider 
trading and Smith appealed.177 Smith alleged on appeal that the 
information leading to his prosecution was illegally gained,178 that the 
information he possessed was not material,179 and that the jury 
instructions were incorrect as they allowed a conviction based on 
mere possession.180 
The court rejected Smith’s contention that the information he 
possessed was not material.181 Smith contended that because the 
information he dealt with was forward-looking182 it could not be 
material as defined by Rule 10b-5.183 The court rejected the idea that 
forward-looking information could not be material.184 
The court dealt more directly with the “possession” versus “use” 
debate during the discussion of the appropriateness of the jury 
 
 175. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); supra text accompanying note 8. 
 176. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1054; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998); supra text 
accompanying note 9. 
 177. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1054. During the district court proceedings, Smith successfully 
moved to have the voicemail message suppressed. Id. After the jury’s guilty finding, Smith 
filed a motion for acquittal or a new trial. This motion was denied. Id. 
 178. Id. Smith felt that the government derived their evidence from an illegal wiretap and it 
should have been excluded. Id. Smith was unsuccessful in this appeal. Because the nexus 
between the intercepted voicemail message and the lion’s share of the evidence independently 
gleaned from the SEC’s investigation (which the U.S. Attorney and the FBI subsequently 
inherited) is sufficiently attenuated, the court affirmed the district court’s decision insofar as it 
concludes that the government’s evidence was not ‘derived from’ the unlawful wiretap within 
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2515. Id. 
 179. Id. at 1055. Specifically, Smith alleged, “that the information he possessed was 
forward-looking, or ‘soft’ information, and hence was not ‘material’ within the meaning of Rule 
10b-5.” Id. 
 180. Id., at 1066. Smith argued that his conviction should have been based on the use of 
inside information. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1066. Specifically, the court stated, “[w]e reject Smith’s contentions that the 
district court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal and in instructing the jury 
based upon the Basic definition of materiality.” Id. 
 182. Id. at 1064. The information consisted of “forecasts of future sales and revenue.” Id. 
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. at 1066. Specifically, the court stated: 
There is, quite simply, no case law to support Smith’s blanket assertion that forward-
looking statements cannot, as a matter of law, constitute “material” information within 
the meaning of Rule 10b-5. Indeed, both the Supreme Court and this court have held to 
the contrary and have observed that determining materiality requires a nuanced, case-
by-case approach.  
Id.  
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instructions.185 The government argued that it was proper for the 
district court to instruct the jury186 that Smith could be convicted of 
insider trading if he possessed material inside information.187 Smith 
contended that the jury instructions inaccurately defined the burden 
the government must meet.188  
The court confirmed that no court in the Ninth Circuit had dealt 
with the “possession” versus “use” debate before it began its 
analysis.189 The court then indicated that the case190 relied upon by 
the government and the SEC for their contention that the possession 
standard was the proper standard only dealt with that determination in 
dictum.191  
After discussion of the analysis in Teicher,192 the court determined 
that the use standard was the proper standard to apply.193 The court 
highlighted the Supreme Court’s past requirement that causation be 
proved,194 as well as the Adler195 decision, to reach that conclusion.196  
 
 185. Id.  
 186. Id. The jury instructions concluded with, “[i]t is enough [to find Smith guilty] if the 
government proves that such inside information was a significant factor in defendant’s decision 
to sell or sell short PDA stock.” Id. 
 187. Id. Specifically, “the government contends, it needed only to prove that Smith 
knowingly possessed material nonpublic information . . . in deciding to buy or sell.” Id. The 
government further contended that “there is no causation element to an insider trading 
prosecution.” Id. 
 188. Id. Specifically, “they ‘confused the jury’ by providing that the government need only 
demonstrate that the inside information was a ‘significant factor’ in his decision to trade, and 
not ‘the reason.’” Id. 
 189. Id. at 1066. “Although the use-possession debate has attracted a good deal of attention 
from academic commentators, very few courts (and none in this circuit) have addressed the 
issue head on.” Id. 
 190. United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993); see also supra notes 36-64 and 
accompanying text. 
 191. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1066. Specifically, the court noted, “in support of their proposed 
‘possession-only’ standard, the government and the SEC rely principally upon dictum from a 
Second Circuit case, United States v. Teicher.” Id. 
 192. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 112.  
 193. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1067. Specifically, the court stated, “[d]espite the Second Circuit’s 
thoughtful analysis, we believe that the weight of authority supports a ‘use’ requirement.” Id. 
 194. Id. Specifically, the court noted, “[t]he Supreme Court has consistently suggested, 
albeit in dictum, that Rule 10b-5 requires that the government prove causation in insider trading 
prosecutions.” Id. The court of appeals then cited such cases as United States v. O’Hagan, 521 
U.S. 642 (1997) and Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) to support this contention. Id.  
 195. 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 196. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1067. “The only court of appeals squarely to consider the causation 
issue concluded that Rule 10b-5 does, entail a ‘use’ requirement.” Id.; see also supra notes 65-
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The court thought it significant that the language of the rules 
supported the necessity of finding a knowing misuse of inside 
information.197 The court expressed concern that those who did not 
actually commit fraud would be punished if the court adopted the 
strict knowing possession standard.198 The court dismissed concerns 
that the burden of proof in criminal cases would be too severe if the 
court adopted the use standard.199 
D. The SEC’s Viewpoint on the Debate 
Although the SEC was leery of defining exactly what constituted 
an insider trading violation,200 attempts by Congress to legislate201 a 
definition encouraged the SEC to verbalize its own.202 The SEC 
 
157. 
 197. Id. at 1068. Specifically, the court stated: 
After all, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not just prohibit certain unspecified acts “in 
connection with” the purchase or sale of securities; rather, they prohibit the 
employment of “manipulative” and “deceptive” trading practices in connection with 
those transactions. This court has expressly held that “scienter” is a necessary element 
of an insider trading violation and has defined scienter as “a mental state embracing 
intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.” 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 198. Id. Specifically, the court noted, “[w]e are concerned that the SEC’s ‘knowing 
possession’ standard would not be—indeed, could not be—strictly limited to those situations 
actually involving intentional fraud.” Id. “Any construction of Rule 10b-5 that de facto 
eliminates the mens rea requirement should be disfavored.” Id. at 1068 n.25. 
 199. Id. at 1069. Specifically, the court stated, “[w]e appreciate that a ‘use’ requirement 
renders criminal prosecutions marginally more difficult for the government to prove. The 
difficulties, however, are by no means insuperable. It is certainly not necessary that the 
government present a smoking gun in every insider trading prosecution.” Id. 
 200. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO 98-355, at 27 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 
2299 (letter from John S. Shad, June 29, 1983). 
 201. Hearing on S.1380 Before Senate Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. S 1380, 100th Cong. § 2 (1987). The original proposed 
Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987 found illegal “use [of] material, nonpublic 
information to purchase or sell any security . . . if [the user] knows or is reckless in not knowing 
that such information has been obtained wrongfully, or if the purchase or sale of such security 
would constitute a wrongful use of such information.” Id.; see also John F. Olson et. al., Recent 
Insider Trading Sanctions Developments: The Search for Clarity, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 715, 728-
29 (1991). 
 202. Specifically, the SEC proposed: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to purchase, sell or cause the 
purchase or sale of, any security while in possession of material nonpublic information 
concerning the issuer or its securities, if such person knows or recklessly disregards 
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adopted the possession standard in its definition.203 The SEC 
reasoned that the possession standard was proper because it would 
preclude the oft-argued claim that a trade was made on some other 
basis than the illegal information.204 Unfortunately,205 Congress never 
enacted legislation containing this concise definition.206 
 
that such information has been obtained wrongfully or that such purchase or sale 
would constitute a wrongful use of such information. 
Text of Draft “Insider Trading Act of 1987” submitted by SEC, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 
1284, 1284 (Aug. 14, 1987). 
 203. After a compromise between the legislators and the SEC, the following appeared in 
the proposal: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to purchase, sell, or cause the 
purchase or sale of, any security, while in possession of material, nonpublic 
information relating thereto, if such person knows or recklessly disregards that such 
information has been obtained wrongfully, or that such purchase or sale would 
constitute a wrongful use of such information. For the purposes of this subsection, 
such trading while in possession of material, nonpublic information is wrongful only if 
such information has been obtained by, or its use would constitute, directly or 
indirectly, (A) theft, bribery, misrepresentation, espionage (through electric or other 
means) or (B) conversion, misappropriation, or any other breach of a fiduciary duty, 
breach of any personal or other relationship of trust and confidence, or breach of any 
contractual or employment relationship. 
SEC Compromise Proposal on Insider Trading Legislation, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 
1819 (Nov. 27, 1987); see supra note 202 to compare this version with the SEC’s original 
verbiage.  
 204. Proposed Language for Inclusion in Committee Report on Insider Trading Definition, 
20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 279, 280 (Feb. 19, 1988). Specifically: 
Individuals who have actually traded on the basis of inside information frequently 
attempt to invent arguments that they have traded for other reasons. Under a 
‘possession’ standard, such post hoc rationalizations would be irrelevant, and could not 
be used to impede enforcement of the law. Concerns that the ‘possession’ standard 
would lead to inappropriate liability are unwarranted, in view of the fact that the 
prohibition would require knowing or reckless conduct as a predicate to any violation. 
Id.  
 205. Unfortunately, because if it was enacted, the current split among circuits might not 
exist. 
 206. The rationale for failing to adopt a definition of insider trading was explained in a 
House Report: 
While cognizant of the importance of providing clear guidelines for behavior which 
may be subject to stiff criminal and civil penalties, the Committee [on Energy and 
Commerce] nevertheless declined to include a statutory definition in this bill for 
several reasons. First, the Committee believed that the court-drawn parameters of 
insider trading have established clear guidelines for the vast majority of traditional 
insider trading cases, and that a statutory definition could potentially be more 
narrowing, and in an unintended manner facilitate schemes to evade the law. Second, 
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This definition was not the only time the SEC adopted a knowing 
possession standard.207 The briefs in both Adler208 and Smith209 
evidenced a preference for the knowing possession standard.210 The 
full SEC has only confronted the debate in two opinions:211 In re 
Investors Management Co., Inc.212 and In re Sterling Drug, Inc.213  
The SEC determined that the use standard was the appropriate 
standard in In re Investors Management, Co., Inc.214 Critics debate 
the significance of the SEC’s adoption of the use standard, but 
nonetheless, it remains the test adopted in In re Investors 
Management, Co., Inc.215  
 
the Committee did not believe that the lack of consensus over the proper delineation of 
an insider trading definition should impede progress on the needed enforcement 
reforms encompassed within this legislation. Accordingly, the Committee does not 
intend to alter the substantive law with respect to insider trading with this legislation. 
The legal principals governing insider trading cases are well-established and widely-
known. 
H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 11 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6048. 
 207. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998); SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 
1325 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Sturc & Cummer, supra note 27. 
 208. SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998); see also supra notes 65-157. 
 209. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998); see also supra notes 158-99. 
 210. Corrected Brief of the SEC at 18, SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998) (No. 
96-6084); Brief of the SEC at 5-6, United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 
97-50137) (“[W]hen a corporate insider like Smith has information relating to his company that 
he knows (or is reckless in not knowing) to be material and nonpublic and he trades in the 
company’s stock, he violates the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, whether or 
not the information is a factor in his decision to trade.”). 
 211. See Nagy supra note 27, at 1148 (“The full Commission, however, has only rarely 
addressed the possession vs. use debate. Indeed, there are only two opinions by the full 
Commission that contain anything more than a passing reference to the issue.”). 
 212. In re Investors Management Co., Inc., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 78,163, at 80,514 (July 29, 1971). 
 213. In re Sterling Drug, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,570, at 
80,295 (Apr. 18, 1978).  
 214. See in re Investors Management Co., Inc., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) at 80,519. 
 215. Nagy, supra note 27, at 1149. Specifically, Nagy noted, “because the opinion adopts a 
use test, some authorities, including the courts in both Adler and Smith, have concluded that In 
re Investors Management undercuts the validity of the SEC’s current interpretation of Rule 10b-
5. But careful analysis of In re Investors Management reveals that this conclusion may have 
been reached in haste.” Id. After some analysis, Nagy concludes:  
Whether the SEC’s statements in In re Investors Management are inconsistent with the 
SEC’s later conclusion in In re Sterling Drug depends on how broadly one reads the 
two opinions. Particularly because the SEC emphasized at the outset of In re Investors 
Management that it was addressing Rule 10b-5 liability in the context of trading by 
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In In re Investors Management, Co., Inc., owners of Douglas 
stock sold almost all of their holdings when they learned of 
unfavorable Douglas earnings information that was not yet released 
to the public.216 After review, the SEC affirmed the hearing 
examiner’s conclusion penalizing all parties for use of material non-
public information.217 In deciding to do so, the SEC traced past cases 
where they found violations as a result of the use of inside 
information.218 The SEC determined that all the necessary 
elements,219 including use,220 were present in In re Investors 
 
tippees, its causality requirement may be read somewhat narrowly, as an element 
essential to establishing tippee liability. The SEC’s statements in In re Sterling Drug 
may also be read more narrowly, to apply only in those contexts in which traditional 
insiders are trading in the shares of their own corporation. In contrast, Adler and Smith 
read both cases more broadly, and implicitly concluded that In re Investors 
Management’s causality requirement was directed at not only securities transactions 
by tippees but also transactions by traditional insiders. It is only through this broader 
reading that one can claim that the SEC’s position in the possession vs. use debate has 
‘undergone some fluctuation over time.’ 
Id. at 1150-51.  
 216. In re Investors Management, Co., Inc., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 78,163, at 80,515-16. Specifically, the Commission noted, “[u]pon receiving the 
unfavorable Douglas earnings information between June 21 and June 23, respondents on those 
days sold a total of 133,400 shares of Douglas stock from existing long positions, which 
constituted virtually all of their holding of Douglas stock, and sold short 21,100 shares, for an 
aggregate price of more than $13,300,000.” Id. 
 217. Id. at 80,514, 80,533. Specifically, the Commission noted, “[w]e find no reason for 
disturbing the hearing examiner’s conclusion that each of the respondents be censured.” Id.  
 218. Id. at 80,514, 80,515-16. Specifically, “in a number of . . . cases . . . we . . . found 
violations of antifraud provisions where persons effected transactions after having obtained 
non-public information.” Id.; see also In re Cady Roberts & Co., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,803 (Nov. 8, 1961); Herbert E. Honahan, 13 S.E.C. 754 (1943) 
(violation when broker obtained confidential information relating to tenders by other 
bondholders, and with the benefit of such information he purchased bonds and successfully 
tendered them to the fund at higher prices); Mates Financial Services, Exchange Act Release 
Nos. 8626 (June 12, 1969) and 8836 (Mar. 9, 1970) (violation when investment adviser 
purchased securities after receiving information of a rise in sales and earnings); Van Alstyne, 
Noel & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 8511 (Jan. 31, 1969) (violation when broker-dealer, 
partners and employees purchased securities for themselves after broker learned of sharp rise in 
sales and earnings); Blyth & Company, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 8499 (Jan. 17, 1969) 
(violation when broker-dealer effected transactions in securities after receiving advance 
information). 
 219. In re Investors Management, Co., Inc., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 78,163, at 80,518-19. Specifically: 
It is clear that in light of the foregoing principles, the conduct of respondents in this 
case came within the ambit and were violative of the antifraud prohibitions of the 
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Management, Co., Inc. to find that the actions were in violation of 
securities laws.221 
Seven years later, the SEC adopted a knowing possession standard 
in In re Sterling Drug, Inc.222 The report was issued, but was not the 
result of any judicial proceeding.223 
In In re Sterling Drug, Inc., several directors sold stocks after 
being informed of decreasing sales before such information was 
released to the public.224 The directors maintained that the inside 
information and the sale of the shares were unconnected.225 The SEC 
 
securities laws. All the requisite elements for the imposition of responsibility were 
present on the facts found by the examiner. We consider those elements to be that the 
information in question be material and non-public; that the tippee, whether he 
receives the information directly or indirectly, know or have reason to know that is 
was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective revelation or otherwise, 
and that the information be a factor in his decision to effect the transaction. 
Id. 
 220. Id. at 80,531. Specifically: 
Turning next to the requirement that the information received be a factor in the 
investment decision, we are of the opinion that where a transaction of the kind 
indicated by the information (e.g., a sale or short sale upon adverse information) is 
effected by the recipient prior to its public dissemination, an inference arises that the 
information was such a factor. The recipient of course may seek to overcome such 
inference by countervailing evidence. Respondents did not meet that burden in this 
case. 
Id. 
 221. See supra notes 219-20. 
 222. In re Sterling Drug, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,570, at 
80, 295 (Apr. 18, 1978). 
 223. Id. at 80,295. Specifically, the Commission noted, “[t]he investigation on which this 
Report is based was in no sense an adjudicatory proceeding and no hearing has been conducted 
by the Commission with respect to any of the issues of fact or law contained herein. Nor is the 
report a determination of the rights or liabilities of any person.” Id. 
 224. Id. at 80,297. Specifically:  
At the Board of Directors meeting on November 1, 1974, the directors were given the 
detailed breakdown of the operating performance for the first nine months of 1974. 
The breakdown showed that although Sterling’s overall sales were up by 13.3% and 
overall net income was up 10.5%, the source of Sterling’s earnings had shifted during 
this accounting period from recent patterns as a result of below-average performance 
by two major domestic divisions and above-average performance by other divisions. 
Id. Two directors sold shares of stock after the meeting. Specifically, “[o]n November 5, 1974, 
the first director sold 8,034 shares of Sterling stock. Between November 6 and [November] 14, 
the second director sold 10,000 shares of Sterling stock.” Id. 
 225. Id. at 80,298. “The three directors also maintain that their reasons for selling their 
Sterling stock were based on considerations completely independent of the performance of [the 
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determined that it was irrelevant whether the two were connected; 
possession of material inside information at the time of trading was 
enough to find a violation of securities laws.226  
II. THE PASSAGE OF RULE 10b5-1 
The SEC proposed Rule 10b5-1227 in December 1999 to resolve 
the circuit split between the possession or use standards in cases of 
insider trading.228 Although debate existed over whether or not the 
SEC should offer a formal definition,229 the SEC determined that the 
time had come to provide a definition.230 The proposed rule stated 
that insider trading liability arises when a person is “aware” of 
material nonpublic information.231 Proposed Rule 10b5-1 provided 
four affirmative defenses under which a person could avoid 
 
company].” Id. 
 226. Id. at 80,298.  
The Commission also believes that Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5) does not 
require a showing that an insider sold his securities for the purpose of taking advantage 
of material non-public information. Purchasers of securities in the public market 
should be able to rely upon information available to the public at the time of the 
transaction. If an insider sells his securities while in possession of material adverse 
non-public information, such an insider is taking advantage of his position to the 
detriment of the public. 
Id. 
 227. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2000); see supra note 6. 
 228. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Sec. Act Rel. 33-7787, 71 SEC Docket 7 
(CCH) ¶ 7, at 732 (Dec. 20, 1999) [hereinafter Selective Disclosure]; see also supra notes 21-
199 and accompanying text. 
 229. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 13 (1983). “[J]udicial interpretations have not provided clear 
boundaries of acceptable conduct and that the case-by-case approach, while appropriate for a 
remedial sanction such as an injunction, would not be appropriate for the civil penalty provided 
under the legislation.” Id. Compare this view to that of Arnold S. Jacobs: “As with any broad 
anti-fraud remedy, the fringes of what constitutes the prohibited act are occasionally fuzzy. 
This, however, does not justify placing a definition in the bill; unscrupulous traders would skirt 
around any definition constructed.” Id.; see also SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(suggesting that the SEC adopt a definition if they are not pleased with the various judicial 
interpretations of Rule 10b-5). Id. at 1337 n.33. 
 230. Selective Disclosure, supra note 228, at 746. Specifically, the Commission noted, “in 
view of the differing opinions expressed in the three cases discussed above [United States v. 
Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998); 
and S.E.C. v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325], . . . it would be useful to define the scope of Rule 10b-5, 
as it applies to the use/possession debate.” Id. 
 231. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2000); see supra note 6. 
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After outlining the circuit split within the proposal introducing the 
Rule,233 the SEC affirmed its long-held view that knowing possession 
was the correct standard.234 The SEC contended that knowing 
possession best satisfied the goals of insider trading laws to protect 
investors and the market.235 The proposed rule includes several 
affirmative defenses because it recognized that knowing possession 
may not always provide the most equitable result.236  
The SEC expressed the view that the strict liability offered by the 
knowing possession standard would incorrectly prosecute individuals 
who make plans to trade prior to obtaining material nonpublic 
information and then trade under the same plan after being made 
aware of the material nonpublic information.237 The SEC rejected the 
use test suggested by the courts under which possession would create 
a strong inference of use.238 According to the SEC, an awareness rule 
with affirmative defenses best allowed for compliance and refuted 
ambiguity.239 
 
 232. See Selective Disclosure, supra note 228, at 733. Specifically, the Commission noted, 
“in these four situations, where a trade resulted from a pre-existing plan, contract, or instruction 
that was made in good faith, it will be clear that the trader did not use the information he or she 
was aware of.” Id.  
 233. Id. at 745-46.  
 234. See supra notes 200-26 and accompanying text. 
 235. Selective Disclosure, supra note 228, at 746. Specifically, the Commission stated, 
“[i]n our view, the goals of insider trading prohibitions-protecting investors and the integrity of 
securities markets-are best accomplished by a standard closer to the ‘knowing possession 
standard.’” Id. 
 236. Id. Specifically, the Commission reasoned, “[w]e recognize that an absolute standard 
based on knowing possession, or awareness, could be overbroad in some respects.” Id. 
 237. Selective Disclosure, supra note 228, at 746. Specifically: 
We recognize that an absolute standard based on knowing possession, or awareness, 
could be overbroad in some respects. Sometimes a person may reach a decision to 
make a particular trade without any awareness of material nonpublic information, but 
then come into possession of such information before the trade actually takes place. A 
rigid ‘knowing possession’ standard would lead to liability in that case. We believe, 
however, that for many cases of this type, a reasonable standard would not make such 
trading automatically illegal. 
Id. 
 238. Id. at 746. The Commission noted, “[t]he Adler case attempted to balance these 
considerations by means of a ‘use’ test with a strong inference of use from ‘possession.’” Id. 
 239. Id. The affirmative defenses are only available “if a contract, plan, or instruction to 
trade relied on for a defense was entered into in good faith, and not as part of a plan or scheme 
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During discussion of the cost-benefit analysis, the SEC 
highlighted two benefits and labeled no costs.240 The SEC thought it 
significant that the proposed rule would increase confidence in the 
market.241 As well, insiders would be able to plan trades without fear 
of prosecution if they complied with the elements outlined in the 
affirmative defenses.242 
The SEC requested comments on the proposed rule.243 There were 
few.244 Of those that did respond, most supported the clarifying 
aspect of Proposed Rule 10b5-1, but expressed concern that the 
affirmative defenses were too narrow.245 The SEC rejected a 
broadening of the affirmative defenses in the final rule because doing 
so would contravene the clarity Rule 10b5-1 was meant to instill.246  
The SEC, however, modified the affirmative defenses in response 
to some of the comments.247 The new and final affirmative 
defenses248 allowed for trades to be arranged when one was unaware 
 
to evade the prohibitions of this Rule.” Id. at 748. 
 240. Id. at 755.  
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 748. 
 244. Proposed Rule 10b5-1 was issued in the same proposal as Regulation FD. Regulation 
FD received countless email comments to the SEC whereas Rule 10b5-1 only received a few. 
Comments on Proposed Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1065-
1 (codified as of April 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199.shtml 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2001).  
 245. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act of 1933 No. 7881 [August 
11, 2000-August 17, 2000 Releases] 73 SEC Docket (CCH) ¶ 1, at 19 (Sept. 18, 2000) 
[hereinafter Selective Disclosure: Final Rule]; see also E-mail from LeBeouf, Lamb, Greene & 
MacRae, L.L.P., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Mar. 29, 2000), at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/S73199/llgm1.htm; E-mail from David M. Furbush, 
Brobeck, Phleger, and Harrison LLP, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Mar. 29, 2000), at 
http://www.edgar-onling.com/fdexpress/comments/furbrush1.asp. 
 246. Selective Disclosure: Final Rule, supra note 245, at 19.  
 247. Id. at 20.  
 248. The affirmative defenses provided for by Rule 10b5-1 are as follows: 
1(i) Subject to paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section, a person’s purchase or sale is not ‘on 
the basis of’ material non public information if the person making the purchase or sale 
demonstrates that: (A) Before becoming aware of the information, the person had: (1) 
Entered into a binding contract to purchase or sell the security, (2) Instructed another 
person to purchase or sell the security for the instructing person’s account, or (3) 
Adopted a written plan for trading securities; (B) The contract, instruction, or plan 
described in paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A) of this Section: (1) Specified the amount of 
securities to be purchased or sold and the price at which and the date on which the 
securities were to be purchased or sold; (2) Included a written formula or algorithm, or 
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of material nonpublic information in a manner considered 
satisfyingly flexible to the SEC.249 The language declaring that a 
violation occurs when a person trades when she is aware of material 
nonpublic information remained the same as proposed and is the 
standard set under Rule 10b5-1.250  
 
computer program, for determining the amount of securities to be purchased or sold 
and the price at which and the date on which the securities were to be purchased or 
sold; or (3) Did not permit the person to exercise any subsequent influence over how, 
when, or whether to effect purchases or sales; provided, in addition, that any other 
person who, pursuant to the contract, instruction, or plan, did exercise such influence 
must not have been aware of the material nonpublic information when doing so; and 
(C) The purchase or sale that occurred was pursuant to the contract, instruction, or 
plan. A purchase or sale is not ‘pursuant to a contract, instruction, or plan’ if, among 
other things, the person who entered into the contract, instruction, or plan altered or 
deviated from the contract, instruction, or plan to purchase or sell securities (whether 
by changing the amount, price, or timing of the purchase or sale), or entered into or 
altered a corresponding or hedging transaction or position with respect to those 
securities. (ii) Paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section is applicable only when the contract, 
instruction, or plan to purchase or sell securities was given or entered into in good faith 
and not as part of a plan or scheme to evade the prohibitions of this section. (iii) This 
paragraph (c)(1)(iii) defines certain terms as used in paragraph (c) of this Section. (A) 
Amount. ‘Amount’ means either a specified number of shares or other securities or a 
specified dollar value of securities. (B) Price. ‘Price’ means the market price on a 
particular date or a limit price, or a particular dollar price. (C) Date. ‘Date’ means, in 
the case of a market order, the specific day of the year on which the order is to be 
executed (or as soon thereafter as is practicable under ordinary principles of best 
execution). “Date” means, in the case of a limit order, a day of the year on which the 
limit order is in force. (2) A person other than a natural person also may demonstrate 
that a purchase or sale of securities is not ‘on the basis of’ material nonpublic 
information if the person demonstrates that: (i) The individual making the investment 
decision on behalf of the person to purchase or sell the securities was not aware of the 
information; and (ii) The person had implemented reasonable policies and procedures, 
taking into consideration the nature of the person’s business, to ensure that individuals 
making investment decisions would not violate the laws prohibiting trading on the 
basis of material nonpublic information. These policies and procedures may include 
those that restrict any purchase, sale, and causing any purchase or sale of any security 
as to which the person has material nonpublic information, or those that prevent such 
individuals form becoming aware of such information. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2001). 
 249. Selective Disclosure: Final Rule, supra note 245, at 20. One hypothetical the SEC 
offered involved a situation where an issuer “adopt[s] a written plan, when it is not aware of 
material nonpublic information, that uses a written formula to derive amounts, prices, and 
dates.” Id.  
 250. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2001); see also supra note 6. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE SUCCESS OF 10b5-1 TO RESOLVE THE  
CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Application of Rule 10b5-1 to the facts of Teicher,251 Adler,252 and 
Smith253 is helpful in determining whether 10b5-1 actually resolves 
the circuit split regarding “possession” versus “use.” 
A. United States v. Teicher254 
In United States v. Teicher,255 the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit found that the knowing possession standard was the proper 
standard to apply in cases of insider trading.256 This standard 
complies with the government’s arguments in that case257 and, upon 
analysis, is consistent with Rule 10b5-1.258 
It is clear from the facts of Teicher259 that Teicher received 
material nonpublic information.260 After the passage of Rule 10b5-1, 
one violates § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 
10b-5 if they trade while aware of material nonpublic information.261 
Teicher was aware of material nonpublic information262 and was 
therefore in violation. 
Interestingly, Rule 10b5-1 appears to resolve one of Teicher’s 
main concerns on appeal. Teicher felt the jury instructions would 
allow a conviction for trading under an established plan, when the 
individual learned of material nonpublic information after making the 
plan, but prior to trading.263 The affirmative defenses offered by Rule 
10b5-1 ensure that in exactly such a situation a defendant will avoid 
liability by showing that the trade in question was made pursuant to a 
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prior plan.264 Based on the facts presented, Teicher did not offer 
evidence of a prior plan and therefore would not have a successful 
affirmative defense.265 This case would have the same outcome if 
Rule 10b5-1 was applied. 
B. SEC v. Adler266 
In SEC v. Adler,267 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
upheld the use standard.268 The court rejected the SEC’s desire for 
application of a knowing possession standard.269 This rejection of the 
knowing possession standard is not as contrary to Rule 10b5-1 as it 
might seem at first glance.270 
The case facts show that the parties were aware of material 
nonpublic information at the time of the trades.271 Pegram’s main 
argument was that he should not be found guilty because he traded on 
the basis of a plan and not the material nonpublic information he 
possessed.272 The SEC argued that regardless of whether or not the 
material nonpublic information was used in the trade, a person 
violates insider trading laws if she trades while in possession of the 
material nonpublic information.273 The SEC recognized the severity 
of such a statement and rejected such absolute liability when it 
decided to offer affirmative defenses in Rule 10b5-1.274  
The court of appeals did not uphold the district court’s granting of 
summary judgment275 because the court felt that while use was 
necessary, possession made the probability of use very high.276 The 
court’s ultimate ruling, although the court did advocate the use 
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 275. See supra notes 94-97, 153-57 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship










220 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 7:189 
 
 
standard within its discussion,277 correlates with Rule 10b5-1. The 
affirmative defenses, by their very meaning, indicate that the 
defendant can offer proof to rebut the presumption of use created 
once an insider is aware of material nonpublic information.278 The 
Adler court’s concerns are met and resolved by Rule 10b5-1. 
C. United States v. Smith279 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also upheld the use 
standard.280 Again, this adoption of a use standard does not mean the 
court would reject Rule 10b5-1. 
The defendant, Smith, was aware of material nonpublic 
information when he executed trades.281 Smith feared that the jury 
instructions would allow a conviction based on mere possession.282 
The court chose the use standard because it was concerned about the 
strict liability that was likely to result if the stringent knowing 
possession standard was adopted.283 The affirmative defenses offered 
by Rule 10b5-1 alleviate these concerns.284 
D. Application of Principles 
Analyses of these three cases show that the courts’ and even the 
defendants’ concerns about the strict liability of a knowing 
possession standard are met within Rule 10b5-1.285 Defendants who 
can prove that they created a plan to trade before becoming aware of 
material nonpublic information will avoid liability.286 Apparently, 
even the SEC realized the dangers associated with a strict knowing 
possession standard.287 
The SEC consistently adopted an unequivocal knowing possession 
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standard.288 Interestingly, the SEC did not choose to use the term 
“knowing possession” within Rule 10b5-1 and instead chose 
“aware,”289 the two terms are used interchangeably by the SEC and 
mean the same thing.290 When faced with defining “on the basis of,” 
the SEC wisely listened to the concerns presented by advocates of the 
use standard. The SEC showed its acknowledgment of the pitfalls of 
a strict knowing possession standard when it adopted Rule 10b5-1 
with affirmative defenses.291 
Parties now have a clear understanding of what constitutes a trade 
on the basis of material nonpublic information and in turn, will be 
better able to avoid doing so. This ability will instill confidence in the 
integrity of the market292 and prevent unwarranted prosecutions. The 
SEC responded successfully to the circuit split and offered a pleasing 
resolution in Rule 10b5-1. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Rule 10b5-1 resolves the circuit split regarding the “possession” 
versus “use” debate.293 It alleviates the concerns of the courts 
adopting the use test.294 Defendants who can prove that they did not 
become aware of material nonpublic information until after making a 
plan to trade can avoid liability.295 Just as the affirmative defenses 
placate the courts and defendants, the “awareness” element of Rule 
10b5-1 allows the SEC to maintain the knowing possession standard 
it advocated for so long.296 
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